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Chen and Sambur: Are Consensual Relationship Agreements a Solution to Sexual Haras

NOTES

ARE CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP
AGREEMENTS A SOLUTION TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE?
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself as a corporate vice-president, working late hours
in a high-stress corporate environment.' Your dinner companion for the
past month has been an executive in your department. You both finish
the project you have been working on and decide to celebrate by eating
at a restaurant. rather than your desk. Over dinner and drinks, the discussion turns to the loneliness involved with working long hours and the
problems with your respective relationships. As the night moves on,
suddenly the truth hits: you and your co-worker are madefor each other
and you suggest ....
The late dinners continue and the relationship runs smoothly for a
while. Noticing your companion's potential, you suggest her name to a
few co-workers for certain career-enhancing assignments. Soon, rumors
start springing up and you find it difficult to concentrate on work while
being the subject of accusations and jokes. Your work product begins to
suffer, particularly after fighting the night before. The lack of communication between you and your companion begins to seriously affect your
job performance. You explain to your companion that the responsibilities of your job and the problems relating to supervising your sexual
partner are not working out as planned. You both agree the relationship
should not continue.
One week later, your ex-companion claims sexual harassment. She
1.This is a fictional story for illustrative purposes only. All names, places and events are fictional
and any similarity to real people, places or events is purely coincidental.
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claims: 1) that she felt coerced into your suggestion to engage in sexual
activity on that first dinner date (quid pro quo harassment),2 2) the sex-

ual relationship continued because you implied that her job was at stake,
and 3) just as she suspected, ever since your relationship ended, you

have been intentionally passing her up for promotions and assignments.
The above hypothetical problem has become a reality in today's
workplace A workplace relationship between a supervisor and

suboordinate employee may imply coercion.' Due to recent Supreme
Court decisions regarding an employer's vicarious liability for sexual

harassment claims, not
5 only will the harassing employee be held liable,

the company will too.
"Workplace romances are relationships between people working
together which are characterized by sexual attraction whether or not
they are made known to others through the participants' behavior."6

Workplace romances pose a number of problems for an employer, such
as: productivity slowdown, an increase of sexual harassment claims,
complaints from co-workers, and employer retaliation.7 A Consensual
Relationship Agreement,' which is similar to a prenuptial agreement,9 is
"one of the newest steps employers are taking to shield themselves from
potential liability over a love affair gone sour in the workplace."' Con2. A quid pro quo harassment claim can be defined as "the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
3. See generally Mark Hansen, Love's Labor Laws, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 78, 79
(discussing Consensual Relationship Agreements as a means of limiting an employer's liability for
sexual harassment claims).
4. See Stewart D. Aaron & Jacob Thomas, Consensual Sexual RelationshipsBetween Supervisors and Subordinates,N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1998, at 1.
5. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (holding employer
liable to employee when employer knew or should have known of harassing behavior); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (same).
6. Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend, Managing the Workplace Romance: Protecting
Employee and Employer Rights, REV. Bus., Winter 1998, at 25.
7. See Aaron & Thomas, supra note 4, at 1.
8. A Consensual Relationship Agreement is an agreement between co-workers which: professes the consensual nature of the parties' relationship, explains and states behavior which is
prohibited should the relationship end, and contains a provision which limits the aggrieved party's
recourse to arbitration. See, e.g., Tom Kuntz, For Water Cooler Paramours, the Ties That
(Legally) Bind, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 4, at 7 (providing a model Consensual Relationship
Agreement).
9. See id. A Consensual Relationship Agreement is similar to a prenuptial agreement in that
both serve a precautionary role at the beginning stage of the relationship, while regulating the potential end of that relationship. See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planningfor Love: The Politics of
PrenuptialAgreements,49 STAN. L. REv. 887, 890 (1997). A prenuptial agreement divides a married couple's assets into marital property and personal property as a precautionary measure for dissolution of the marriage. See id.
10. Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
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sensual Relationship Agreements were pioneered by the San Francisco

law firm of Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason ("Littler
Mendelson")" to prohibit a failed office romance from evolving into
litigation. 2 These written agreements show that a relationship is
"consensual, that neither [employee] is harassing the other and that [the
couple] won't engage in favoritism."' 3 However, this new invention
spawned by "jittery corporate executives" has not been tested in court. 4
On July 26, 1998, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions
that have increased the stakes for sexual harassment claims. 5 In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,16 and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,7 the
Court held that "an employer is subject to vicarious liability under Title
VII to a victimized employee for actionable discrimination caused by a

supervisor with or without immediate or successively higher authority
over the employee."' 8 The impact of this holding is now becoming visible as claims against employers are being decided upon motions of
summary judgment. 9 It is quite possible that the implementation of
Consensual Relationship Agreements could help buttress the affirmative
defense available to employers under the Burlington Industries and
Faragherdecisions.20
The conflicting circuit court decisions pertaining to the viability of
contract clauses that require arbitration, are comparable to clauses in

Consensual Relationship Agreements which restrain the claimant by
mandating an in-house review rather than judicial redress.2' The central
11. See Kuntz, supra note 8, at 7. It has come to the authors' attention that there is a dispute
as to who originated this type of agreement. See Margaret Hammersley, 'Love Contract' Between
Office Sweethearts May Protect Employersfrom Sexual Harassment Suits, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 1,
1999, at DI (giving credit to Rob Carrol for creating the Consensual Relationship Agreement).
12. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
13. L.M. Sixel, Do PactsAmount to Legal Condoms?, Hous. CHRON., May 1, 1998, at 1C.
14. Hansen, supranote 3, at 79.
15. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
16. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
17. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
18. Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
19. See, e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998) (renewing motion of summary judgment in light of holdings in BurlingtonIndustries and Faragher).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.; Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S.
Ct. at 2292.
21. Compare Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y 1998)
(allowing arbitration of Title VII claims so long as the arbitral forum: is procedurally fair, does not
impose financial burdens to access the arbitral forum, and must allow similar statutory remedies to
Title VII), with Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1998)
(denying an employer the use of compelled arbitration based on Securities Exchange Registration
Form U-4).
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provision of Consensual Relationship Agreements is the ability to waive
one's right to have the claim adjudicated in federal court.22 This waiver
of judicial redress makes Consensual Relationship Agreements requiring in-house arbitration of claims beneficial, especially from the employer's perspective.?3
This Note will outline the utility of Consensual Relationship
Agreements as they apply to the workplace. In Part II, the Agreement
will be reduced to individual provisions and the law relating to these
provisions will be analyzed. This Note will discuss the requirements of a
compulsory arbitration agreement. Furthermore, this Note will analyze
the effects of recent Supreme Court rulings, paying close attention to the
effect of Consensual Relationship Agreements on employer liability.
Part III will provide background information by describing the
creation of Consensual Relationship Agreements. This section will discuss what workplaces have done to insulate themselves from liability
for sexual harassment. This section will address current office policies
that deal with sexual harassment, employment practice liability insurance,2 4 strict policies prohibiting office dating, a company's hands-off
approach leaving workplace romances to the employee's good judgment,' and other alternatives. Additionally, this section addresses the
overlap of these possible solutions.
Part IV will discuss the benefits and liabilities of Consensual Relationship Agreements from the competing perspectives of employers and
employees.
Part V will discuss whether Consensual Relationship Agreements
pose a solution to sexual harassment in today's workplace.

22. See Kuntz, supra note 8, at 7 (relying on section 9 of sample Consensual Relationship
Agreement excerpted in article); Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
23. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
24. See Marcia Coyle, Employers Under Siege Get Coverage, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 8, 1997, at
Bl. Employers purchase Employment Practice Liability Insurance ("EPLI") in order to protect
themselves from harassment and discrimination claims. See id.
25. See No Safety from Sexual Harassment Claims but Companies Can Help Themselves
with GoodPolicies, Training,CoRP. LEGAL TIMNEs, Sept. 1998, at 36.
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II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW PERTAINING TO CONSENSUAL
RELATIONSHIP AGREEMENTS

A. A Beginner's Guide to Sexual HarassmentLaw and Title VII
Sexual harassment claims arise from Congress' enactment of Title
VII. 26 There are two recognized types of sexual harassment claims.'
These claims are quid pro quo and hostile work environment harass-

ment." Quid pro quo harassment involves the "conditioning of concrete
employment benefits on sexual favors." 29 Hostile work environment
claims do not include sexual harassment manifested through economic

benefits, but rather involve harassment which creates a hostile or abusive work environment."

In order to establish a quid pro quo harassment claim, a plaintiff
must prove five elements.3 A plaintiff-employee must demonstrate that:
"1) the plaintiff-employee is a member of a protected group; 2) the sexual advances were unwelcome; 3) the harassment was sexually motivated; 4) the employee's reaction to the supervisor's advances affected a

tangible aspect of her employment; and 5) respondeatsuperiorliability
has been established.

32

Quid pro quo harassment relates to Consensual

Relationship Agreements in that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit
could base her claim upon quid pro quo harassment, and that the claim
arose prior to the signing of the agreement.33 Thus, the plaintiff could
claim that the agreement was agreed upon, only due to the coercion in26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
27. See Jana Howard Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, New Developments in the Law of Sexual
Harassment from Meritor to Harris, Karibian and Steiner, H-524 PRACrICiNG LAW INSTITUTE/LmGATION 7, 18 (1995).
28. See id.
29. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
30. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 62.
31. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777,783 (1st Cir. 1990).
32. Id. "'Tangible adverse employment action' includes the loss of significant job benefits or
characteristics, such as the resources necessary for an employee to do his or her job .... Durham
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1999). Tangible adverse employment action has
been defined as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998).
33. For instance, Jill, who is Jack's supervisor, tells Jack that he must accompany her up the
hill for a sexual liaison or else she will fire him. Later, Jill also tells Jack to sign a Consensual Relationship Agreement, which would proclaim the "consensual" nature of the relationship between
them. Unfortunately for Jill, she has not avoided a sexual harassment suit because Jack's claim
arose before the signing of the agreement.
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herent within the quid pro quo claim.
A claim of discrimination due to a hostile work environment can be
raised when an employer's conduct interferes with an individual's work
performance, or creates an "intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment."' The Second Circuit has stated that in a hostile work environment action:
[A] complaining employee is required to prove that... [the] conduct
[at issue] was unwelcome, that the conduct was prompted simply because of the employee's gender, and that the conduct was sufficiently
pervasive to create an offensive environment antithetical to the priority
of merit-not sex or some other prohibited criterion-in the workplace.3 5
The court continued by setting out a five-part test, similar to the
court's test for quid pro quo harassment.36 After the relationship has
ended, a hostile work environment claim may arise. However, by entering into a Consensual Relationship Agreement, the parties' dispute
would be adjudicated in a non-judicial forum.
B. The ChangingNature of Sexual HarassmentLaw

1. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Beginnings of Liability
The Supreme Court has distinguished and defined the concepts of
quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment.38 In
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 9 the Supreme Court held that a Title
VII sexual harassment claim could be predicated upon either a showing

34. Trotta v. Mobile Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). For instance, Jill
defeats Jack's quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and remains Jack's supervisor. Ever since
their trips to the top of the hill have ended, Jill lets Jack know that she feels that the less a man
wears, the better. One day, she tells him, "Jack, I expect to see you without that shirt tomorrow."
The next day, Jill sneaks up behind Jack and proceeds to try to remove his shirt. Jack remains
clothed, yet, without explanation, he is transferred to a less prestigious job the next week. Jack
could maintain a hostile work environment claim against Jill.
35. Trotta, 788 F. Supp. at 1348 (quoting Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d
569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989)).
36. See Trotta, 788 F. Supp. at 1348; Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir.
1986); cf Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (adopting the concept that
any action must be based upon an objectively or subjectively hostile work environment).
37. See Hansen, supranote 3, at 79.
38. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62, 65 (1986).
39. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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of quid pro quo sexual harassment or a hostile work environment.40 The
Court held "that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment.",4' The Court noted that the harassment must affect
"terms, conditions or privileges of employment" according to the
framework of Title VII. a' Furthermore, the Court held that in order
"[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment.'4 3 However, in Meritor, the
Court refused to hold the bank liable for an employee's alleged harassment of a co-worker due to the many unresolved questions of fact." The
Court stated that, in theory, the principles of agency should govern sexual harassment claims. 45
2. Burlington Industries and Faragher:The Creation of Vicarious
Liability for Employee Conduct Outside the Scope of Employment
Recent Supreme Court decisions have created an incentive for an
employer to take a more active role in regulating workplace relationships and preparing for sexual harassment claims arising from such relationships. 46 In BurlingtonIndustries and Faragher,the Supreme Court
held that an employer is subject to vicarious liability under Title VII for
unlawful discrimination caused by a supervisor. 7 The fact that an employer will be held responsible for such discrimination should create an
incentive to reduce their liability. This could be accomplished by either: 1) taking a more proactive role in investigating claims of harassment or, 2) reducing the likelihood that claims could be pursued in federal court.49

40. See id. at 63-67.
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. The Court justified the creation of hostile work environment
claims in the sexual harassment context by comparing them to hostile work environment claims
based on race. See id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1994); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).
44. See id. at 73.
45. See id. at 72.
46. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
47. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2280.
48. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79, 80; see also Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292 (creating an
affirmative defense for employers to show they exercised reasonable care in preventing or ending
harassment).
49. SeeFaragher,118 S. Ct. at2292.
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In Burlington Industries, the Court embraced the Meritor decision

as directing courts to look to common law agency principles. Furthermore, the Court clarified the extent of employer liability which was
never decided in Meritor.1 The Burlington Industries Court admitted

that over the preceding years, the claims provided for in Meritor, quid
pro quo and hostile work environment claims, took on greater legal significance.52 However, an employer's vicarious liability for acts done by
an employee previously only arose in quid pro quo sexual harassment
claims. 3 This rule "encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state their claims
as quid pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure on the
definition."" Thus, hostile work environment claims were couched in
quid pro quo language to enable plaintiffs to hold employers vicariously
liable."5 The issue before the Court in Burlington Industries was
"whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a
hostile work, environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based upon sex, but does not
fulfill the threat."5'6
The Court in Burlington Industries relied upon general principles
of agency law in order to create a basis for vicarious liabilityY As a
general matter, a "master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment."" The
Court noted that an employee's motive in serving the employer is irrelevant when determining whether his conduct is within the scope of employment. 9 The Court also stated that "[t]he general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employ-

50.

See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2264.

51. See id. at 2265-70.
52. See id. at 2264-65.
53. See id.; Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing

vicarious liability in quid pro quo cases, but in hostile work environment cases, for vicarious liability to apply, the employer must know of the harassment).
54. Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2265.

55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 2265-68.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
59. See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2267; see, e.g., Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 237
(4th Cir. 1994) (categorizing supervisor's unfair criticism of subordinate's work in retaliation for
rejecting his sexual advances as not within scope of employment); Wood v. United States, 995
F.2d 1122, 1123 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating sexual harassment which amounts to assault and battery is
"clearly outside the scope of employment"); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d
167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting the difference between foreseeable risks of employee malfeasance which creates liability, and unforseeable risks which do not).
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ment."' However, scope of employment does not provide
61 the sole basis
for employer liability when applying agency principles.
The Court in Burlington Industries relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2) (1958) to provide a basis for vicarious liability when the actor's conduct is outside the scope of employment. 2
For employer liability, negligence is the minimum standard. Employer
liability will arise "where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment.... [and] if it knew or should have known about the conduct and
failed to stop it."' However, the standard for vicarious liability, called
the "aided in the agency relation standard" is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958).' An employer would not
be liable for the torts of its employees acting outside the scope of employment unless, "'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of
the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."' 6 This standard requires more than the employment relationship
aiding the commission of the harassment; it also requires that the discriminatory act result in a "tangible employment action against the subordinate." 67
The Court defined a tangible employment action as "a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits."'' This type of action can only
occur at the hands of a supervisor or someone acting with the authority
of the company; the official power of the enterprise is brought to bear
against the victim of the harassment.' While the Court did not explicitly
defie the boundaries of the aided in the agency relation standard, the
Court stated that this standard would always be met "when a supervisor
takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate." 70
60. BurlingtonIndus., 118 S.Ct. at 2267.

61. See id.
62. See id.; RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
63. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S.Ct. at 2267.

64. Id.
65. Id; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)(1958). This standard was also
adopted by the Court in Faragher.See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290
(1998).
66. BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2267 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY §

219(2)(d) (1958)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 2269.
70. Id.
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Finally, the BurlingtonIndustries Court provided for an affirmative
defense for employers who would be held vicariously liable for their
employee's action. 71 The defense contains two elements: 1) "the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior" and 2) "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." ' The Court
noted that the employer will not automatically escape liability by establishing an anti-harassment policy, but establishing such a policy may
provide more protection, when compared to an employer who does not
have any policy.73 With regard to the second element, the Court stated
proof that an employee failed to avoid harm is not limited to failing to
take advantage of any anti-harassment policy promulgated by the employer.74 However, the employee's failure to avoid harm will validate
the employer's affirmative defense. Lastly, the Court disallowed the
use of this affirmative defense in cases where the "harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or
6
undesirable reassignment."
In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, the Court came to the same decision as that reached in BurlingtonIndustries, holding an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's acts of sexual harassment." In
Faragher,the Court examined the affirmative defense introduced in the
BurlingtonIndustries decision. The Court explained that this affirmative defense would be the proper method for implementing and enforcing Title VII policy because it would "recognize the employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit.., to
employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty."' 9
An employer may... have provided a proven, effective mechanism
for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available
to the employee without undue risk or expense. If the plaintiff unrea71. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
72. Id.

73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Burlington Indus., 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
77. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998).
78. See id. at 2275, 2280, 2293. See generally Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270 ("[A]
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.... No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action....").
79. Faragher,118S. Ct. at2292.
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sonably failed to avail herself of the employer's preventive or remedial
apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been
avoided if she had done so. If the victim could have avoided harm, no
liability should be found against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no
award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her
own efforts could have avoided.t0
This policy provides the proper incentive for employers, and it encourages the employee's duty to avoid harm by seeking redress through
the employer's sexual harassment policy."'
C. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., and the Employer's
Attempt to Avoid Vicarious Liability Through the Use of Contracts
Due to the recent decisions in Burlington Industries and Faragher,
employers are currently searching for methods to limit their liability
arising out of Title VII claims.8 2 Rather than rely on the affirmative defense provided for in Burlington Industries and Faragher,employers
have begun to limit their employees' ability to bring Title VII claims before a court.8 3 Recently, the Supreme Court disallowed an employer's
practice of compelling union employees, whose union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, into binding arbitration.'8
The recent Supreme Court decision, Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,8s has had the effect of limiting an employer's ability to
compel arbitration of a Title VII claim. s6 In Wright, employers were attempting to rely on a collective bargaining agreement, containing an
arbitration clause, as a means to contract out of liability arising7 from
Title VII claims and to force those claims into binding arbitration.
In Wright, the Court held that a general arbitration provision in a
collective bargaining agreement may not serve as a waiver of an em80. Id.

81. See id.
82. See generally Kuntz, supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the attempt made by dozens of companies in recent years to shield themselves from harassment or discrimination suits by requiring
Consensual Relationship Agreements).
83. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 393 (1998) (prohibiting
employer from enforcing arbitration provision in collective bargaining agreement).
84. See id. at 393, 397.
85. 119S. Ct. 391 (1998).

86. See id.
87. See id. at 393-95. The arbitration clause required all disputes between the parties, which
could not be settled promptly, to be decided by a committee made up of representatives of the labor union and the employer. See id. at 393.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 17:165

ployee's right to bring a Title VII claim in the appropriate court 8 The
Court attempted to reconcile two lines of cases that were at odds with
one another.89 The first line of cases is represented by Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo.,9° "which held that an employee does not forfeit his
right to a judicial forum for claimed discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII... if 'he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. ' ' '9' Furthermore, "[t]he statutory cause of action was not waived
by the union's agreement to the arbitration provision of the [collective
bargaining agreement], since 'there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VI." '92
The second line of cases is represented by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.93 In Gilmer, the Court relied on the federal
policy favoring arbitration embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 94 and held that "statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA." 95 Furthermore, the
Gilmer Court noted that Alexander held that an employee's rights under
Title VII may not be prospectively waived. 96 However, the Gilmer Court
held that a party may waive its right to a federal judicial forum for an
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")' claim.98
The Wright Court eventually denied the defendant's claim and held
that the "petitioner's statutory claim [is] not subject to a presumption of
arbitrability; we think any [collective bargaining agreement] requirement to arbitrate.., must be particularly clear."
The standard the Court used in Wright was first discussed in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB.re In Metropolitan Edison, the Court
stated that § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")1°'
88. See id. at 394-95.
89. See id. at 394.
90. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
91. Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 394 (quotingAlexander, 415 U.S. at 49).
92. Id. (quotingAlexander, 415 U.S. at 51).

93. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that Gilmer did not meet his burden of showing that
Congress intended to preclude arbitration of claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")).
94. The Federal Arbitration Act is the federal law that provides for, and codifies, the judicial

preference for binding arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
96. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 395; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.

97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)
98. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26,35.
99. Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
100. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
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allows a union to waive its officers' statutory right to be free from anti° The
union discrimination, if such a waiver is clear and unmistakable.'O
Court stated that "we will not infer from a general contractual provision
that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right, unless the
undertaking is 'explicitly stated.""' This clear and unmistakable standard must be met when a union waives a statutorily protected right of its
members.0 4 The Wright Court embraced this standard and held that the
Longshore Seniority Plan did not contain the requisite clear and unmistakable waiver, but the Court never reached a decision on whether this
type of waiver would be enforceable.'l5
Thus, a union-negotiated employment contract that requires arbitration of claims arising from employment, may not compel mandatory
arbitration of Title VII claims. l° However, the Court's ruling did not
address whether a specific provision of an employment contract, having
the effect of waiving the employee's right to use judicial means to resolve a Title VII claim, was permitted by Title VII.' °
Whereas Wright involved a union-negotiated waiver, Gilmer in0 ' The
volved an individual waiving his own right to a statutory claim."
Court in Gilmer recognized an individual's ability to waive a statutory
claim and to subject that claim to arbitration."° The Court stated that
"'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."'. 0 Furthermore,
"'[hiaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
'' The method of dejudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue"."
termining whether Congress intended to preclude waiver would be to
look to the text of the statute, its legislative history, as well as any conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." 2 In Gilmer, the Court found that the ADEA did not evince Congressional intent

102. See Metropolitan Edison,460 U.S. at 708.
103. Id. (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956)).

104. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397; MetropolitanEdison, 460 U.S. at 708.
105. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397.

106. See id. at 396.
107. See id.
at 397.
108. See id.
at 392-93; Gilmer,500 U.S. at 23.

109. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
110. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
111. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 628).

112. See id.
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to preclude waiver, and enforced a contract which required arbitration of
any ADEA claim."3 Ultimately, the Court has allowed the waiver of
statutory rights provided: 1) they are waived by the actual individual
whose rights are being waived;". 2) the contractual waiver is clear and
5 and 3) there is no clear Congressional intent showing
unmistakable,"
6
otherwise."
]II. EMPLOYER SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICIES AND OTHER OPTIONS
USED TO REDUCE EMPLOYER LIABILITY

A. The Creationof ConsensualRelationship Agreements
Consensual Relationship Agreements were created by Jeffrey
Tanenbaum, a partner at Littler Mendelson in San Francisco."' Gary
Mathiason, a partner at Littler Mendelson, explains that the Consensual
Relationship Agreement "was developed for situations where you have
typically an executive that wants to have a relationship with an employee, and is very mindful of the legal land mine that they're about to
walk in, and tries to build in some understandings and protections.""' 8
The agreement accomplishes three objectives:
Number one, it confmns in writing the relationship is voluntary. Number two, it very specifically has both parties agree that if there's
something that happens that is unwanted--one party breaks off the relationship, the other one doesn't want it broke off-that they would at
least use the company's complaint procedure. And finally, if there is a
disagreement, a real problem later on, it gets resolved through mediation and arbitration. It stays out of the courts." 9
These contracts, which are in their infancy, have yet to see the in-

113. See idat 26-27, 33-35.
114. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35 (allowing an individual to waive his own statutory right to
judicial redress); cf Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396 (prohibiting a union from waiving the collective
statutory rights of its members to seek redress).
115. See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at396.
116. See id. at 395; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).

117. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 78-79; Hammersley, supra note 11, at Dl.
118. Talk of the Nation, National Public Radio, Oct. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2933872
(hereinafter NPR Broadcast).
119. Id.
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side of a courtroom.'9 They are rarely constructed or recommended.' 2 '
B. ConsensualRelationshipAgreements: The Relevant Terms of These
Contracts

The defining characteristics of Consensual Relationship Agreements include: the designation that the relationship is consensual, a
provision that provides for arbitration in case of breach, and that one
party to the contract holds a higher position than the other party and
both are employed by the same entity.' These provisions have numerous effects and each serves a different purpose in -protecting the parties
from harm, should the social relationship between the parties end."l
These agreements serve to insulate an employer from vicarious liability
by removing the case from the court and compelling arbitration." It is
this final provision that makes these agreements ripe for extensive
study. 12
120. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
121. See NPR Broadcast, supra note 118.
122. See Hammersley, supra note 11, at D1; see, e.g., Kuntz, supra note 8, at 7 (exemplifying
a typical Consensual Relationship Agreement). Consensual Relationship Agreements, as other
contracts, can differ substantially. These agreements should represent the intentions of the parties
and also contain the aforementioned provisions.
123. See Kuntz, supra note 8, at 7.
124. See Hansen, supranote 3, at 79; Kuntz, supranote 8, at 7.
125. The following is an example of a Consensual Relationship Agreement which was printed
in Tom Kuntz's article, For Water CoolerParamours,the Ties That (Legally)Bind:
STIPULATIONS - The Parties stipulate that:
A. [Male employee] is presently employed by the Company in the position of
[position].
B. [Female employee] is presently employed by the Company in the position of
[position].
C. [Female employee] is not presently, and has never been, under the direct supervision
of [male employee].... Although the professional obligations and work responsibilities
of [male employee] and [female employee] occasionally involve interaction on a professional level, the regular assignments and job tasks of [male employee] and [female
employee] do not require, necessitate or provide occasion for such interaction.
D. [Male employee] and [female employee] each, independently and collectively, desire
to undertake and pursue a mutually consensual social and/or amorous relationship
("Social Relationship") with the other.
E. [Male employee's] desire to undertake, pursue and participate in said Social Relationship is completely and entirely welcome, voluntary and consensual and is unrelated
to the Company, [male employee's] professional or work-related responsibilities or duties, or [male employee's] and [female employee's] respective positions in the Company or business relationship to each other. As of the date this Acknowledgment and
Agreement is executed by [male employee] ... agrees that nothing in any way related
to, stemming from, or arising out of his relationship with [female employee], be it their
business-related interaction or their Social Relationship, constitutes, has resulted in, or
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has caused a violation of the Company's Sexual Harassment Policy or any law or regulation.
F. [Female employee's] desire to undertake, pursue and participate in said Social Relationship is... entirely welcome, voluntary and consensual [etc., vice versa the entire
preceding paragraph to cover the female employee]. ...
G. [Male employee] has entered into said Social Relationship after having discussed in
depth with [female employee] the ramifications and implications of entering into a Social Relationship with a co-worker of [female employee's] professional position and
after having had the opportunity to discuss such matters with counsel of choice or any
other person of his choosing.
H. Vice versa the entire preceding paragraph to cover the [female employee]....
AGREEMENT
1. [Male employee] and [female employee] have, after reading this Acknowledgment
and Agreement, carefully reviewed the Company' [sic] Sexual Harassment Policy, a
copy of which is attached hereto.... [Male employee] and [female employee] understand and agree to abide by and be bound by said Policy.
The agreement then requires the signers to notify the company representative witnessing the agreement of any violations of the sexual harassmentpolicy or related laws, or
if the relationshipis "negatively affecting in any way the terms and conditions" of their
employment. But there is another option:
4. If, for any reason, either employee does not believe that reporting said violation, suspected violation or incident to [Company representative] would result in a full and fair
investigation and remedy, either employee may instead report said violation, suspected
violation or incident to the Director of Human Resources of the Company. Said report
may be written or verbal and should include details of the incident[s] and names of witnesses.
5. The Company shall immediately and impartially investigate said violation, suspected
violation or incident and take any and all appropriate remedial action, up to and including termination, pursuant to established Company policy and law. Remedial action will
be commensurate with the circumstances. Appropriate steps will also be taken to deter
any future violations or incidents.
6. [Male employee] and [female employee] understand and agree that conduct or speech
in the workplace which is sexual or amorous may be objectionable or offensive to others. Therefore, [male employee] and [female employee] agree not to engage in such
conduct on Company property or when performing work-related tasks in public areas.
Such prohibited conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following: holding hands or
touching in an affectionate or sexually suggestive manner, kissing or hugging; romantic
or sexually suggestive gestures; romantic or sexually suggestive speech or conmunications, whether oral or written; and display of sexually suggestive objects or pictures.
7. [Male employee] and [female employee] acknowledge and agree that he and she, respectively, has the right and ability to end said Social Relationship at any time without
repercussion of any work-related nature, and without retaliation of any form by the
other.
8. While the Social Relationship continues [male employee] and/or [female employee]
will not request, apply for, seek in any way, or accept a direct supervisory or reporting
relationship by or between [female employee] and [male employee].
9. [Male employee] and [female employee] have executed and agree to be bound by the
Company's Agreement to Abide by Arbitration Procedure.... Paragraph 5 of this Acknowledgment and Agreement and [Company] Arbitration Procedure shall set forth the
exclusive remedy for, and shall constitute the exclusive forum for resolution of, any and
all disputes which arise or may arise out of the Social Relationship and any claims of
harassment, discrimination or retaliation by or between [male employee] and [female
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C. EmployerSexual HarassmentPolicies
The recent decisions in Burlington Industries and Faragherprovide for an affirmative defense which can be utilized by an employer in
a sexual harassment case." In order to rely on this defense, an employer
is required to offer evidence that it has an existing sexual harassment
policy.12 The existence of such a policy would be used to show that an
employee failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer." Sexual harassment policies have
no magical provisions that provide absolute protection from liability.
However, the mere presence of the policy provides a basis for protection
under the affirmative defense.'29
Company sexual harassment policies vary greatly from company to
company. Some companies ban inter-office relationships, while others
acquiesce to these relationships."3 While any specific company policy
will reflect the views of that company, each policy should address the
following items. Each policy must provide a clear statement that sexual
harassment is strictly forbidden and describe the types of conduct the
policy forbids.' An employer must indicate the consequences for violating the policy. 312 An employer should include a complaint mechanism
that permits employees to bypass a supervisor involved in the harassment. "'3 Furthermore, any policy should be distributed to all employees
and the employer should receive a signed acknowledgment of receipt
from the employee.' 4 Moreover, any current policy should be re-

employee]....
14. The Parties, having read all the foregoing, including attachments, and... having
been notified of the right to seek the advice of counsel and having understood and
agreed to the terms and conditions of the Acknowledgment and Agreement do hereby
execute said Acknowledgment and Agreement by affixing their signatures hereto.
Dated:_
By: [Male employee]
Dated:_
By: [Female employee]
Dated:_
By: [Company Representative]
Kuntz, supranote 8, at 7.
126. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
127. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
128. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292.
129. See BurlingtonIndus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
130. See William C. Symonds et al., Sex on the Job, The Lewinsky Effect: Business Takes a
CloserLook at Executive Affairs, Bus. WK., Feb. 16, 1998, at 30.
131. See Beverly W. Garafalo, PracticalGuidelinesfor Employers, CORP. CouNs., July 1998,
at 3.
132. See id.

133. See id. at 4.
134. See id.
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evaluated and reissued to take into account any changes in the law.
Lastly, any complaint must be acted on promptly, corrective action
should be taken immediately, and an employer
must prevent retaliation
13 5
complaint.
a
makes
who
employee
any
against
D. Legal Risks Associatedwith Office Romances
Consensual Relationship Agreements try to accomplish the same
goal as anti-harassment policies - avoiding employer liability.1 6 In contrast to anti-harassment policies that delineate proper conduct in the
workplace, Consensual Relationship Agreements address the problems
that may occur should co-workers enter into a workplace romance.3 In
theory, these agreements clarify the intent of the parties, i.e. the consensual nature of the signatories' relationship and the method of redress
should a party breach the agreement. 38 However, in practice, these
agreements provide limited protection to the employee in the higher
position, as well as the employer.'39 These agreements do not dispel the
possibility of litigation, but may serve as evidence of the parties' intent
in any subsequent litigation should the relationship fail and a claim of
harassment ensue."
Those contemplating having a romantic relationship within the
workplace, and their employers, can benefit from Consensual Relationship Agreements. Although many office romances turn out to be beneficial to the parties and the workplace, the fear of an office romance
gone sour must be addressed. A failed workplace relationship may result
in: a sexual harassment claim,1 41 loss of a job, 42 a productivity slowdown, 43 lowered morale among workers,'" meritocracy complaints or
suspicions from co-workers, 45 employer retaliation, 46 a company's non-

135. See id.
136. See Bruce T. Rubenstein, You Can'tImmunize Yourself but You Can Preparea Defense,
CORP. LEGAL TriEs, Apr. 1998, at4.
137. See Kuntz, supranote 8, at 7.
138. See NPR Broadcast, supranote 118.
139. See Rubenstein, supra note 136, at 4.
140. See id.
141. See Mike Causey, DangerousLiaisons,WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at B2.
142. See NPR Broadcast, supranote 118.
143. See Paul & Townsend, supra note 6, at 25.

144. See id.
145. See Jonathan J. Higuera, Workplace Romance, TUCSON CITIZEN, Nov. 2, 1998, TREND$
(Magazine), at IT (meritocracy complaints); see also Dwight R. Worley, Employers Struggle with
Romances at Workplace, FLA. TODAY, Nov. 8, 1998, at 1E (suspicions from co-workers),
146. See Paul & Townsend, supra note 6, at 25
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professional appearance 47 and inevitable office gossip.' The employer
can face the potential problems of a failed relationship either before the
relationship begins, or after it ends. 149 A Consensual Relationship
Agreement acknowledges the various legal risks assumed by all parties
when consenting to an office romance.
E. Statistics and Reports
In the past six years, sexual harassment complaints in the workplace have more than doubled.'' According to the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission ("EEOC"), complaints have risen from
6,883 in 1991 to 15,589 in 1997.52 Within the same time period, sexual
harassment damage awards rose from $7.1 million to $49.5 million. 5 s
These numbers would frighten any employer, yet a surprising number of
companies do not have written policies for office romances."
According to a 1994 American Management Association study, 80
percent of the 485 managers surveyed have either had or have known of
an office romance.'55 Additionally, a Bureau of National Affairs study
conducted in 1988 concluded that at that time, one-third of all relationships started in the workplace.'56 The surveys also found that between 25
percent to 33 percent of employees admitted to having had an office romance.
A 1993 survey by the Society for Human Resources Management
reported that 84 percent of responding companies allowed husband-wife
teams. 5' Companies may even encourage these teams, leading to the
relationship jargon of 'joint partnering.' 159 A 1991 Human Resource
Management survey reported that 98 percent of all companies allow co-

147. See Jaine Carter & James D. Carter, Facing up to Workplace Romances, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 26, 1998, at 4E.
148. See Paul & Townsend, supranote 6, at 25.
149. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
150. See Kuntz, supra note 8,at 7.
151. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 79.
152. See id.
153. See L
154. See Worley, supra note 145, at 1E; Higuera, supra note 145, at IT.
155. See DENNis M. POWERS, THE OFFICE ROMANCE: PLAYING VrrH Fie WITHOUT GErIG
BURNED 1,1 (1999).
156. See id.
157. See id. at5.
158. See id.
at 25.
159. Joint Partnering refers to making relationship decisions jointly. See id. For instance, deciding what actions to take should the relationship fail. See id. at 13-14.
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workers to date."'
A 1998 poll from the Society for Human Resource Management
shows that out of 617 employers, 13 percent had written policies."' In
the same survey, 14 percent of the employers had unwritten policies and
another 72 percent had never addressed relationship issues." Other reports show that companies handle relationship issues as they arise.'
Those organizations that have a workplace romance policy propose
different consequences to violators of the policy. "Consequences include[] transfer within the organization (42 percent), termination (27
percent), counseling (26 percent), formal reprimand (25 percent) and
demotion (7 percent). In addition, 25 percent do not have any consequences."' 6
In a 1997 Strategic Outsourcing survey, 91 percent of 592 companies
stated they had "no formal policies regulating dating among coworkers."' Generally, employers prefer to let employees use their
common sense with office romances because employers are reluctant to
get involved.' However, the pressure of employer obligations with respect to harassment is forcing companies to rethink their passive approach. 67
F. Samples ofIndividual Office Policies thatDealwith Sexual
Harassmentor Office Romance
Employers have adopted different anti-harassment policies depending on the particular work atmosphere and employee situations. Sometimes a manager will observe a workplace relationship, recommend discretion, and separate the individuals."l Other employers have certain
policies to deal with inappropriate relationships, i.e. relationships when
a partner supervises, assigns work and/or overtime, or affects the other
partner's assignments.' 69
New Jersey Attorney General Peter Verniero applied a date-andtell policy for his agency, requiring supervisors to report any consensual
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See POwERs, supra note 155, at 11.
See Worley, supra note 145, at lE.
See Higuera,supra note 145, at IT.
See Worley, supra note 145, at 1E.
l
Carter & Carter, supra note 147, at 4E.
See Worley, supranote 145, at 1E.

167. See id.
168.

See NPR Broadcast, supra note 118.

169. See id.
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personal relationships with subordinates.170 The policy came into effect
the day after a large sexual harassment case was lost, where a former
deputy attorney general was awarded $350,000.17' Large damage awards
compel employers to institute new anti-harassment policies or review
their current ones."
Melbourne-based Space Coast Credit Union has a far more stringent policy, which requires one worker to resign in a workplace couple
that gets married. 3 This policy lets the couple decide who is going to
resign.7
Other companies possess less stringent requirements. "'We don't
require that our employees tell us if they're in a relationship' with a coworker, said Shirley Emily [a corporate vice-president of human resources]. 'But we tell them it176is best they do for their own protection and
the company's protection."
1. Employer Practice Liability Insurance
New tactics, similar to the Consensual Relationship Agreement, are
springing up everywhere to protect employers from liability. For example, there is a new type of insurance employers can obtain to protect
themselves from litigation and cosily financial losses. 7 7 "The insurance,
known as employment practices liability coverage or ["EPLI"], provides
protection from sexual harassment, wrongful termination, discrimination and other employment-related legal claims.' ' 7 EPLI, once only
available through a few companies, has grown into "one of the industry's best-selling products today.... About [seventy] companies now
coverage, and more than half of all Fortune 500 companies
offer [EPLI]
179
have it.'

170. See Nancy Ritter, Aftermath of HarassmentCase: New AG Policy - If You Kiss, You Tell,
NJ. LAW., Aug. 24, 1998 at 1; discussion infra Part III.F.2.
171. See Ritter, supranote 170, at 1.
172. See Worley, supranote 145, at 1E.

173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.

176.

d.

177. See Hansen, supranote 3, at 80.

178. Id.
179. Id.
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2. Date-and-Tell Policy
Kissing and telling was never the respected protocol for workplace
relationships, however, it is now required at New Jersey's most powerful law enforcement agency. 80 As introduced earlier, after a jury verdict
of $350,000 against his Office, New Jersey Attorney General Peter
Verniero "instituted a policy requiring supervisors to reveal if they are
involved in an intimate relationship with a subordinate."'' After the
Attorney General's Office is notified of the existence of the relationship,
the Office will consider the reassignment of one of the employees.'
Date-and-tell polices mandate disclosure of consensual personal relationships.'83 Generally, employers define consensual personal relationships as "'dating and other ongoing relationships of an intimate or close
personal nature..... [including] marriage, cohabitation, and engagement."' 4 It does not include, however, "purely social friendships." "s
3. Overlapping of Policies
As an employer must attempt to limit their own liability, it is important to note that as part of the process of creating a Consensual Relationship Agreement, a couple is required to review their company's sexual harassment policy. 18 6 There are typically eight stipulations in a
Consensual Relationship Agreement.7 These stipulations include: mutual consent to engage in the relationship, a voluntary relationship that is
not business related, the relationship poses no violation of the company's sexual harassment policy, and each individual is able to terminate the relationship without adverse consequences.' 88
Two excerpts from a sample Consensual Relationship Agreement
and cover letter are shown below:8 9
Though I know you have received a copy of [our company's] sexual

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
1998, at
187.
188.
189.

See Ritter, supra note 170, at 1.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Ritter, supra note 170, at 1.
See Deanna Hodgin, Lawyers Try to Define Terms of Endearment, RECORDER, Sept. 28,
1, available in LEXIS, News Library, All.
See id.
See id.
See Kuntz, supranote 8, at 7.
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harassment policy, I am enclosing a copy.., so that you can read and
review it again. Once you have done so, I would greatly appreciate
your signing this letter below, if you are in agreement with me.

I have read this letter and the accompanying sexual harassment policy
and I understand and agree with what is stated in both this letter and
the sexual harassment policy. My relationship with [name] has been
(and is) voluntary, consensual and welcome. I also understand that I
am free to end this relationship at any time and, in doing so, it will not
adversely impact on my job. 90
This language demonstrates the sensitivity and stringent attention
given to the mutual consent which is required to make these agreements
work.
4. Benefits and Disadvantages of Consensual Relationship Agreements
Expressed Through Practitioner Viewpoints
" ' A partner in a naNot everyone is in love with the love contract.19
tionally prominent law firm's employment group believes that these
agreements are inherently coercive.'" He is also concerned about privacy issues and whether it is the parties' intent to enter into a contract,
especially when third parties notify the employer about the relationship,
and the employer then asks the parties to sign a contract.9
A senior partner at a leading employment law firm expresses concern over waiving statutorily protected rights, such as the right to be free
of employment related bias.' 94 Another practitioner expresses concern
over unintended consequences, the contract being discriminatory on its
face, or an absence of consideration.9 Others have characterized these
agreements as overkill that may be destructive to morale.'96 Another disadvantage is the insecurity employers could experience because this

190. aId
191. See Hogdin, supra note 186, at 1.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Rubenstein, supra note 136, at 4

195. See Hogdin, supra note 186, at 1.
196. See Stuart Silverstein, Employers Use Consent Form to Regulate Office Romances,
TIB.(MINNEAPoIis, MN), Sept. 28, 1998, atD6.
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type of agreement does not guarantee immunity from sexual harassment

claims, but merely provides an indeterminate measure
of security be1
cause these agreements have not been tested in court. 9

5. Employer Regulation of Personal Relationships

One argument against the validity of Consensual Relationship
Agreements is possible discrimination by an employer. Once the em-

ployer realizes the protection this agreement gives him, he will try to get
couples at work to enter these agreements as soon as possible. The
problem arises when an employer discriminates, e.g., discharges or fails

to promote an employee who will not enter into one of these agreements. Depending on the state, there are laws that protect an employee
from this type of discrimination. 8 However, laws prohibiting employer
regulation of personal relationships are "sparse and conflicting... it is

unclear whether an employer may regulate dating between his or her
employees under any circumstances.""'

Company anti-fraternization policies have increasingly been
adopted in an effort to prohibit romantic relations among co-workers.' 0
While trying to support employee rights, several states have enacted

laws protecting employee relationships.20 ' Thirty states and the District
of Columbia have already adopted laws which serve to protect employees' privacy outside the workplace.= However, only Colorado,' 3 North
Dakota,2m and New York,' 5 have enacted statutes which are general

enough to protect nearly all non-employment related activities.21 Inter197. See Higuera,supranote 145, at IT.
198. See Seth Howard Borden, Note, Love's Labor Law: Establishinga Uniform Interpretation of New York's "Legal RecreationalActivities" Law to Allow Employers to Enforce No-Dating
Policies, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 353, 356 (1996); see also Alyce H. Rogers, Note, Employer Regulation of Romantic Relationships:The Unsettled Law of New York State, 13 TOuRO L. REv. 687, 687
(1997) (noting that several states have enacted laws to protect relationships between employees).
199. Borden, supra note 198, at 365.
200. See Rogers, supranote 198, at 687.
201. See id.
202. See id.
at 698-99.
203. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (Supp. 1999) (stating that is an unfair practice to discriminate against employees for engaging in lawful activities while not at work or during
work).
204. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-0.8 (1997) (making it unlawful to discriminate in hiring
or firing for a lawful activity outside work which does not interfere with the business interests of
the employer).
205. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney Supp. 1999) (stating that employers cannot discriminate against anyone for outside legal activities that occur away from the workplace).
206. See Rogers, supranote 198, at 699.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol17/iss1/9

24

1999]

Chen and Sambur: Are Consensual Relationship Agreements a Solution to Sexual Haras
ConsensualRelationshipAgreements

estingly, the statutes of New York, Colorado, and North Dakota all have
nearly identical language, however, only in New York and Colorado has
the issue of co-worker dating been raised.2
The New York statute differs from those in Colorado and North
Dakota by its inclusion of the word "recreational" which describes the

protected activity. 2° In respect to co-worker dating, this particular word
has clouded the otherwise clear meaning of the New York statute.2 The
ambiguous phrase "legal recreational activity" has not been resolved by
the courts and the two cases brought under section 201-d of the New
York Labor Law have achieved inconsistent results.2 0
In New York v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,2 the court held that the
definition of "recreational activities," was unambiguous and did not include a dating relationship with someone other than the party's husband
or wife.1 2 The court in Pasch v. Katz Media Corp.213 held that:

207. See id. at 700.
208. See id.
209. See id. Colorado and North Dakota use the term "lawful activities," which clearly protects employee office romances and dating of a co-worker. See id.
210. See id. "Section 201-d was intended generally to ensure that individuals who partake in
an infinite variety of activities outside of work are secure in their employment, provided they are
competent employees. What is less clear, however, is the intended breadth of Section 201-d's protection." Borden supra note 198, at 356-57; cf Jennifer L. Dean, Note, Employer Regulation of
Employee PersonalRelationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1067-68 (1996) ("Although no state
statute specifically protects coworker dating, three state statutes extend protection to all legal offhours activities, as long as those activities do not pose a direct conflict with the employer's legitimate business interests.").
New York's statute was passed as part of a national movement to protect employees'
rights to engage in certain off-the-job activities. Initially this movement, which was
fostered by tobacco companies, involved only legislation protecting employees from
discrimination because they smoked off the job. Discrimination against smokers grew
in the 1980s when employers discovered that employing smokers increased their health
care costs as well as their exposure to liability for second-hand smoke injuries.
Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life - Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee Associational
PrivacyRights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47, 50 (1997) (describing the legislative history of the N.Y. statute) (footnotes omitted).
211. 207 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
212. See id. at 152. Defendant discharged two employees who violated a written company
policy prohibiting a dating relationship between a married employee and someone other than their
spouse. See id. at 151. Plaintiff argued that this discharge violated section 201-d(2)(c) of the New
York Labor Law because this was a legal recreational activity pursued outside of work. See id. The
court responded:
To us, "dating" is entirely distinct from and, in fact, bears little resemblance to
"recreational activity." Whether characterized as a relationship or an activity, an indispensable element of "dating," in fact its raison d'8tre, is romance, either pursued or realized.
... [Tihe voluminous legislative history to the enactment, including memoranda issued
in connection with the veto of two earlier more expansive bills, evinces an obvious in-
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legislative history show[ed] ... the purpose of the statute is to prohibit
employers from discriminating against their employees simply because
the employer does not like the activities an employee engages in after
work. The legislative history indicates the statute was intended to include social activities, whether or not they have a romantic element, so
long as the activity occurs outside work hours, off of the employer's
premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property; and does not create a material conflict of interest related to the
employer's trade secrets,
proprietary information, or other proprietary
214
or business interest.
Unfortunately, Colorado, New York, and North Dakota have not
yet reached a consensus on whether workplace romances are protected
legal activities." 5

6. Benefits of Consensual Relationship Agreements
Consensual Relationship Agreements, unlike some of the above
mentioned company policies, offer the employee's active participation
in the creation of the agreement, its terms, and the consequences of
failing to abide by the agreement. These agreements also provide hardto-dismiss evidence of a consensual relationship in any future litigation.
A partner at a leading employment law firm conceded that an employer's risk of liability is not eliminated by this agreement. 216 However,
"'it's certainly not going to be the kind of case where a jury will feel
'217
much sensitivity' toward someone suing for harassment.
Even though such contracts may not eliminate all of the employer's liability, they do "provide a measure of legal protection for employers
who lack other options., 21 ' Employers may not want to lose their best
employees just because they are engaging in a relationship within the
tent to limit the statutory protection to certain clearly defined categories of leisure-time
activities.
Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
213. 10 Individual Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Plaintiff argued she was
constructively terminated from her employment when Defendant replaced her with a male employee with fewer qualifications. See id. at 1575. "Plaintiff [assistant to the VicePresident/Divisional Manager] contends that [her]... demotion occurred solely because Plaintiff
continued to maintain a personal relationship with Mr. Braunstein [Vice-President and General
Sales Manager] and that it occurred in an effort to humiliate her and force her to quit." Id.
214. It at 1578.
215. See Rogers, supranote 198, at 699-700.
216. See Silverstein, supranote 196, at D6.
217. Id.
218. Worley, supranote 145, at 1E.
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workplace.
IV. A COMPARISON OF CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP AGREEMENTS AND

PRENUPTiAL AGREEMENTS
By comparing Consensual Relationship Agreements to the other
love contract, prenuptial agreements, we gain valuable insight about the
probable success of Consensual Relationship Agreements and what they
contribute to individual relationships. Specifically, these points will be
addressed by looking at the public's view of prenuptial agreements and
the negative inference which accompanies a contract based on love.
Prenuptial agreements "detail the division of property or other assets upon death or divorce [of a marriage partner], they may also include
provisions regulating the ongoing marriage."2 9 They "allow couples to
specify which assets should be considered marital property and which
assets should be treated as personal property upon dissolution of the
marriage."' Similar to prenuptial agreements, Consensual Relationship
Agreements may: attract a negative public image, manifest unfair bargaining positions, detail the legal consequences should the relationship
end, and require informed consent from the couple before entering the
agreement.
A negative image seems to develop naturally from the timing and
purpose of prenuptial agreements. 2 t Prenuptial agreements are seen as
roadblocks to the romantic notion of love and marriage.'m It is hard to
contemplate divorce and death while being in love. Addressing possible
unfavorable conclusions in a relationship is antithetical to why the parties began the relationship.
A negative stereotype of prenuptial agreements is highlighted by
the argument that these agreements perpetuate the unfair bargaining
position of women and the less-financially secure spouse.
[One argument] against prenuptial agreements is the allegation that one
party may not be treating his or her fianc6 in a fair manner. Not surprisingly, the wealthier party may impose terms on the less well-off

219. Marston, supra note 9, at 889.
220. Id. at 890.
221. See id. at 888. "Viewed by many as the province of the wealthy, the age disparate, the
heartless, or the simply greedy, prenuptial agreements are often regarded with distrust and hostility." Id.
222. See id. at 893.
223. See id at 894, 911.
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party. Many critics argue that prenuptial agreements overwhelmingly

hurt women by virtue of their inferior bargaining position.2

The benefit of planning for disaster can be seen through the advantages of having a prenuptial agreement. A prenuptial agreement reduces
family tension, creates open communication, encourages honesty and
illustrates the equality within a marriage by requiring equitable treatment upon divorce.'
Some commentators believe that prenuptial agreements possess

one major flaw - a lack of safeguards.2 For instance, prenuptial agreements do not require the parties to consult independent counsel before

recognizing the agreements to be valid.'a 7 This particular omission in
prenuptial agreements creates an awareness of a similar deficiency present in Consensual Relationship Agreements. Although Consensual Relationship Agreements require couples to: 1) knowledgeably enter into
the agreement, 2) review the contract and an attached copy of the office

sexual harassment policy, 3) take an active part in creating the terms of
the contract, and 4) sign the agreement;'

these agreements could also

benefit from an additional requirement compelling the parties to seek
independent counsel.
If we were to require an attorney from each party to be present at
the signing of the contract, this would be problematic for those who

cannot afford an attorney. One must consider this possibility, even
though these agreements appear to be tailored to high-income and
highly-placed employees.

Extending this analogy, the contractual validity of prenuptial
agreements strengthen the validity of Consensual Relationship Agree-

ments. The contractual law governing prenuptial agreements may be
summarized as follows:
224. Marston, supra note 9, at 911. "Courts often fail to acknowledge the impact of unequal
bargaining power on the provisions of prenuptial agreements by emphasizing the contract itself
rather than the legal rights the parties have forgone by signing it." Id. at 912. But see id. at 894
(pointing out that "some experts argue that prenuptials may actually benefit women because
'[w]omen, who have traditionally had less power, may feel their rights are best protected if they
are formalized"' (quoting LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRAcr: SpousEs, LovERs,
AND THE LAW 243 (1981))).
225. See id. at 895, 906-07.
226. See id. at 888, 915-16.
227. See id. at 913. Since most laypeople are unaware of the legal ramifications of a prenuptial agreement, a rule which encourages parties to seek independent counsel would work to reduce
potential problems by informing a party of the rights he or she is waiving by signing the agreement. Additionally, an independent counsel requirement would serve to level the playing field for
those without counsel and make these agreements more palatable to the general public.
228. See discussion supra Part EII.A-B.
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[P]renuptial agreements must adhere to the normal rules of contract:
They must be entered into voluntarily, "made by competent parties,
supported by consideration, comply with any applicable statute of
frauds and be consistent with public policy." However, unlike ordinary
contracts, the parties need not show consideration; the marriage itself
fulfills that prerequisite. Nevertheless prenuptial agreements remain
more vulnerable to attack than commercial contracts because of special
standards that govern their enforcement. Provisions of prenuptial
agreements that conflict with public policy will not be enforced.2 9
However, there exist two major differences between prenuptial
agreements and Consensual Relationship Agreements: 1) prenuptial
agreements are based on common law rather than statutory law prohibiting sexual harassment and, 2) sexual harassment law, which was created
by the legislature and influenced by public policy, encompasses problematic quid pro quo cases.' A quid pro quo case would rarely be affected by the presence of a Consensual Relationship Agreement due to
claims of coercion. In this particular situation, a claim of coercion
would normally arise before the parties signed the Consensual Relationship Agreement.
V. IS A CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP AGREEMENT A SOLUTION TO

SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
The primary purpose of the Consensual Relationship Agreement is
to limit liability and prevent sexual harassment lawsuits. However, is a
reduction in liability all this new agreement can accomplish? Consensual Relationship Agreements curb pseudo-harassment which does not
qualify as severe or pervasive enough to fall within Title VII's prohibitions. Furthermore, these agreements regulate a couple's romantic behavior in the workplace, which may offend other employees or otherwise affect morale. Consensual Relationship Agreements are not a
panacea to the current state of affairs in sexual harassment law. However, the agreement's judicial waiver and arbitration provisions are
valid, and when taken as a whole, do serve to protect the signatories
from sexual harassment.
The authors agree on two points. First, the authors agree that the
invention of a Consensual Relationship Agreement should be praised
229. Marston, supra note 9, at 898 (quoting Emy Sigler, Comment, Elgar v. Probate Appeal:
The Probate Court's Implied Powers to Construe and to Enforce Pre-Nuptial Agreements, 9
CONN. PROB. L.J 145, 148 (1994)).
230. See id. at 897.
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and considered a bold attempt to find a solution to sexual harassment in
the workplace. Second, the authors question the validity of a Consensual
Relationship Agreement that provides unequal benefits to the parties.
The Consensual Relationship Agreement clearly benefits the superior employee of the couple by reducing the potential for a successful
lawsuit against the higher-placed employee. However, it limits the
lower-placed employee's right to bring a sexual harassment action in
court by providing an alternative forum for their claim. The one benefit
the inferior party gains is the ability to be free from any non-actionable
harassment from a scorned lover after the relationship ends. For this
reason, both parties would have an extra incentive to maintain a cordial
working relationship with each other, should the intimate relationship
fail. With the exception of being in love, it remains difficult to explain
why the lower employee might enter such an agreement.
In terms of the possible benefits to employers, this agreement provides a great amount of protection with a minimal amount of risk. Even
though such agreements do not negate both hostile work environment
and quid pro quo claims, such agreements would clearly benefit the
employer by limiting potential lawsuits to quid pro quo claims, which
have traditionally allowed vicarious liability.
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